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Abstract 
 
Building on previous literature, we assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting terrorism 
using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008.  
Bilteral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: domestic, 
transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We consistently establish that foreign aid 
(bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism exclusively in countries 
where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This finding is consistent with our 
theoretical underpinnings because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards 
fighting transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to 
target their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase 
with initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most 
significant in recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. Policy 
implications and future research directions are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 According to a new report on Global Peace released in June 2015, macroeconomic 
factors have substantially been affected by the deterioration on peace over the past couple of 
years (Arnet, 2015). According to the account, consequences of the Arab Spring and 
increasing spread of terrorism are unlikely to stop in the near future, hence diminishing the 
possibilities of a strong rebound in political stability, non-violence and peace. The resulting 
real economic cost associated with (i) increasing violence and (ii) measures for its 
containment, stood around 19% of global economic growth between 2012 and 2013. This 
represents about 1,350 USD per capita. If World violence were to be mitigated by 10%, it 
would generate wealth equivalent to inter alia: sixfold of Greece’s total bailout, tenfold of the 
total official development assistance (ODA) to poor from rich countries and threefold the total 
income of 1.1 billion people living under 1.25 USD a day or in extreme poverty. The 
associated cost to providing support to about 50 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and refugees is highest since the Second World War and now cost about 123 billion USD 
annually. The ultimate consequence is a negative economic cycle with inter alia: low 
economic growth as more and more resources are allocated forcounterterrorism.  Hence 
terrorism slows down growth, reducingthe capacity of developing nations to fight terrorism.  
The nexus between fighting terrorism and foreign aid stems from a number of factors: first, 
some developing nations do not have the capacity to fight terrorism.Second, some forms of 
terrorism are transnational in motivation and activity such that their encounter also requires an 
international approach and resources.  Yet even domestic terrorism can have spill over effects.  
Third, some forms of terrorism aim at assets and interests of developed nations in the 
developing countries.    
 The purpose of this paper is to empirically establish when foreign aid is effective in 
fighting terrorism.We use bilateral, multilateral and total aid variables of foreign aid without 
distinguishing it into tied and untied aid for counterterrorism.  This is behind the backdrop 
that terrorism is fought both directly and indirectly through military interventions and socio-
economic development.  According to Azam and Thelen(2008) the level of foreign aid 
received reduces the supply of terrorist attacks by recipient countries, as does the recipient 
country’s level of education.  Azam and Thelen (2010) find that Western democracies which 
are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid, with special 
emphasis on supporting education, and use military interventions more sparingly.  We would 
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like to establish what type of aid is effective under what type of terrorism?  Terrorism is 
distinguished into: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics.   
A lot of previous literature has focused on linkages among other macroeconomic 
variables, terrorism, conflicts and political violence. To the best of our knowledge, this 
underlying literature has revolved around: the impact of terrorism on innovation (Koh, 2007), 
the influence of natural resources (Humphreys, 2005) and the role of development assistance 
in reducing the negative impact of terrorism on macroeconomic variables (Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015). This last stream on the use of foreign aid to 
fight terrorism is closest to the present line of inquiry.  
Another evolving current of the literature has been devoted to the fight against crimes, 
conflicts and terrorism. Some mechanisms that have been explored entail the following: 
respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); ensuring external and internal transparency (Bell et 
al., 2014); the relevance of corruption-control as the most effective governance tool (Asongu 
&Kodila-Tedika, 2016); military dimensions (Feridun&Shahbaz, 2010); the importance of 
investigating attitudes towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007); the growing role of press freedom 
and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013) and critical role of education (Brockhoff et al., 2014), 
especially in terms of bilingualism to consolidate the spirit of mutual  identity (Costa et al., 
2008) and lifelong learning in reducing political violence and instability (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016).  
As far as we have reviewed, studies on the direct linkage between foreign aid and 
terrorism are scarce. We build on studies that have investigated the indirect linkages to 
investigate the effect of foreign aid on terrorism. These include, literature on the role of 
foreign aid in reducing the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2014), especially when the underlying relationship is conditioned on domestic corruption-
control levels (Efobi et al., 2015) and existing levels of FDI (Asongu et al., 2015). In order to 
provide room for more policy implication, we use four (three) terrorism (aid) variables, 
namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism (multilateral, bilateral and total 
aid).  The sample is focused on developing countries for a twofold reason: (i) Gaibulloev and 
Sandler (2009) have established that developing countries are more vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks and (ii) development assistance fundamentally flows from advanced to developing 
countries. The estimation strategy employed articulates the conditional distributions of 
terrorism because we aim to distinguish high- from low-terrorism countries in the underlying 
relationship. The intuition for this distinction is that, blanket foreign aid policies in the fight 
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against terrorism may not be effectiveness unless they are contingent on initial terrorism 
levels and hence, tailored differently across countries experiencing low, medium and high 
levels of terrorism. But before we engage the analysis, it is relevant to devote some space to 
briefly discussing the theoretical underpinnings for the underlying nexus between foreign aid 
and terrorism.  
 Foreign aid can be used by recipient countries affected by terrorism for conflict 
management and social control. This builds on the Conflict Management Model (CMM) and 
the Social Control Theory (SCT) from Thomas-Kilman and Black respectively (Akinwale, 
2010, p. 125). This theoretical underpinning is consistent with recent literature that has 
employed foreign aid in dampening the potentially negative effect of terrorism on 
macroeconomic variables (Asongu et al., 2015). According to the CMM, strategic intentions 
revolve around two main axes (assertiveness and cooperation), which when combined with 
collaboration yields five styles of conflict management, notably: avoidance, competition, 
accommodation, compromise and collaboration. As concerns the SCT, nexuses among 
individuals, groups and organisations influence the exercise of one of the five main 
mechanisms of social control, namely: avoidance, self-help, negotiation, settlement and 
tolerance. 
 The account from Akinwale is in accordance with the broad literature on conflict 
management, inter alia: Black (1990), Thomas (1992), Borg (1992 and Volkema and 
Bergmann (1995). These underlying theoretical underpinnings are in line with the positioning 
of this study because development assistance is expected to reduce terrorism via channels of, 
among others: education, respect of the rule of law, subsidizing of government expenditure 
and social responsibility. In light of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) discussed above, the fight 
against terrorism crowds-out government expenditure, hence foreign aid could be used to 
subsidise the depleting government expenditure. Other factors (social responsibility, 
education and respect for the rule of law) have been documented by the substantial bulk of 
literature on their positive role on non-violence and political stability (Heyneman, 2002; 
Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009;  Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016).  
 It is also important to devote space to clarifying the expected effect of foreign aid on 
various terrorism dynamics, notably: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Of 
these four, unclear and total terrorisms have not been documented to be particularly targeted 
by development assistance because donors tend to be more concerned about terrorists 
6 
 
activities that threaten them from a potential recipient country (Boutton and Carter, 2013). In 
this light, we expect donors’ aid to be sensitive to transnational terrorism relative to domestic 
terrorism. According to Boutton and Carter, a donor country (e.g the USA) is particularly 
concerned with activities of terrorism within the state boarders of a recipient country that 
targets the interest of the donor. Conversely, the presence of domestic terrorism that does not 
translate into transnational terrorism (to target donor interest) is generally unrelated to donor 
aid allocation. In this light, we expect the effect of foreign aid to be most significant in 
mitigating transnational terrorism. Moreover, given that we are assessing aid effects on 
terrorism throughout the conditional distribution of terrorism, the impact should be highest in 
top quantiles of the transnational terrorism distribution. In other words, we theoretically 
expect the effect of foreign aid to be most significant in countries with the highest levels of 
transnational terrorism.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical results and discussions are covered in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data 
 Consistent with the motivation of the study, we build on panel data from 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015) which consists of three year non-
overlapping intervals from 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008
1
. The starting 
year is 1984 because institutional variables from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 
2010) datasetare only available from this year. The dependent variables are terrorism 
dynamics, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism, with the last 
measurement being the sum of the first-three. The motivation of employing many terrorism 
indicators is to avail more room for policy implications. In the same vein, three foreign aid 
indicators are used, namely: bilateral, multilateral and total aid.  
                                                          
1
 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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 The control variables are selected based on documented factors behind the Arab spring 
(Khandelwal&Roitman, 2012 ) which have been employed more recently in predicting the 
Arab Spring (Asongu &Nwachukwu, 2015) and controlling for the effect of lifelong learning 
on non-violence and political stability (Asongu &Nwuchukwu, 2016). These include:  GDPg, 
inflation, infrastructure, exchange rate, political globalisation, civil conflicts. We have also 
documented in the introduction the linkage between economic growth and terrorism from a 
substantial bulk of literature. Very high inflation should logically be linked to political strife 
and violence, due to inter alia: (i) diminishing purchasing power and (ii) reducing domestic 
investment because of a negative economic outlook. Internal or civil conflicts should 
intuitively increase the likelihood for terrorist activities.Political globalisation has been 
documented to be associated with increased possibilities of conflicts (Lalountas et al., 2011; 
Asongu, 2014a). Infrastructural development in terms of mobile phone penetration facilitates 
the coordination and development of conflicts. It was very vital during and after the Arab 
Spring in countries still affected by the crisis. The effect of exchange rates on terrorism is 
difficult to establish in advance. While Rodrik (2008) has documented that the positive role of 
high exchange rates on economic growth is more apparent in developing countries, exchange 
rates not associated with a good production bases that facilitate exports (like the situation of 
Zimbabwe) may increase political strife, violence and ultimately breed fertile grounds for 
terrorism. Definitions of the underlying   variables are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Total Aid  LnTotaid Ln. of Total aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Ln. of Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Ln. of Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Ln. of Number of terrorism incidents whose category in 
unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Ln. of Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political LnPolglob Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
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globalisation 
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators. Ln: Logarithm.  
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the employed variables. Some are defined in 
logarithms to enable comparisons in terms of means. We can also observe that there is a 
considerable degree variation in the variables, meaning that we can be confident that 
significant estimated nexuses would emerge. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Total Aid (ln) 5.550 1.276 0.800 8.495 608 
      
Domestic terrorism(ln) 1.316 1.849 -1.098 6.038 405 
      
Transnational terrorism(ln) 0.530 1.243 -1.098 4.143 353 
      
Unclear terrorism(ln) 0.471 1.452 -1.098 4.454 224 
      
Total terrorism(ln) 1.490 1.847 -1.098 6.168 451 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
 The purpose of the correlation matrix in Table 3 is to control for concerns of 
multicollinearity and overparameterization. The potential concerns which are highlighted in 
bold are among foreign aid and terrorism dynamics. Therefore we avoid employing more than 
one foreign aid variable in the same specification. The underlying concerns are not very 
relevant to terrorism variables because they are used as dependent variables.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix (n=174, with uniform sample size) 
              
GDPg LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid LnDomter LnTranater LnUnclter LnTotter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 0.058 -0.334 0.202 0.230 0.179 0.227 -0.094 0.015 -0.131 -0.077 0.117 -0.048 GDPg 
 1.000 -0.039 0.080 -0.256 -0.504 -0.363 0.173 0.188 0.026 0.172 0.362 -0.248 LnTel 
  1.000 -0.454 -0.287 -0.218 -0.297 0.066 0.107 0.029 0.057 -0.175 0.067 LnInflation 
   1.000 0.102 0.116 0.127 -0.077 -0.016 -0.061 -0.070 0.161 -0.075 LnXrate 
    1.000 0.590 0.958 0.110 0.042 0.068 0.118 0.277 0.190 LnBilaid 
     1.000 0.772 -0.034 -0.131 0.015 -0.035 0.046 0.196 LnMulaid 
      1.000 0.081 -0.001 0.064 0.087 0.252 0.206 LnTotaid 
       1.000 0.702 0.738 0.975 0.249 0.457 Domter 
        1.000 0.597 0.789 0.187 0.402 Tranater 
         1.000 0.810 0.092 0.414 Unclter 
          1.000 0.251 0.472 Totter 
           1.000 -0.068 LnPolglob 
            1.000 Civcon 
              
GDPg: GDP growth rate.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  LnDomter:  
Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.   
LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
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2. 2 Methodology 
 
Consistent  with the underlying literature on conditional determinants (Billger&Goel, 
2009; Asongu et al., 2015), in order to investigate if existing levels in terrorism affect the 
impact of foreign aid on terrorism in developing countries, we employ a quantile regression 
(QR) approach. It consists of assessing the determinants of terrorism throughout the 
conditional distributions of terrorism (Keonker&Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on determinants like Bandyopadhyay et al., (2014) and Efobi et al. 
(2015), have reported parameter estimates at the conditional mean of the dependent variable. 
While mean efects are important, we extend the underlying terrorism literature by employing 
QR to distinguish between initial levels of terrorism. For example, while Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) assumes that terrorism and error terms are distributed normally, the QR 
approach is not based on the assumption of error  terms that are normally distributed. 
Therefore, the techinque enables us to assess the effect of foreign aid on terrorism with 
particular emphasis on low- medium- and high-terrorism countries. Accordingly, with QR, 
parameter estimates are derived at multiple points of the conditional distributions of terrorism 
(Keonker&Hallock, 2001). The QR technique is increasingly being employed in development 
literature, notably in: corruption (Billger&Goel, 2009; Okada &Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 
2013) and health studies (Asongu, 2014b).  
The  thquantile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of 
simplicity and ease of presentation.   
   






 
 







ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                             (1)
 
Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance the 25
th
 or 75
th
quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of terrorism or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
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where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of terrorism. For the model in Eq. (2) the dependent 
variable iy  is the terrorism indicator while ix  contains a constant term, GDP growth, 
inflation, infrastructure, exchange rate, political globalisation and civil/internal conflicts. 
The specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the multicollinearity and 
overparameterization issues identified in Table 3. 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results 
 Tables 4, 5, 6 respectively show findings for bilateral, multilateral and total aid.  Panel 
A of all tables presents findings for domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism in the left-
hand-side (LHS) and right-hand-side (RHS) respectively while Panel B shows results for 
unclear terrorism and total terrorism respectively in LHS and RHS. We notice that the OLS 
findings which are based on mean values of the dependent variables are different in terms of 
signs and magnitude of estimated coefficients when QR is considered. Hence, this difference 
also justifies the choice of the estimated technique.  
 The following findings can be established with regards to bilateral aid and terrorism in 
Table 4. First, bilateral aid: (i) increases domestic terrorism consistently with increasing 
magnitude from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantile; (ii) increases transnational terrorism from the 
0.10
th
 to the 0.50
th
quantile but decreases it at the 0.90
th
quantile; (iii) has no significant effect 
on unclear terrorism and (iv) consistently increases total terrorism in a wave-like pattern. 
Second, the significant control variables have the expected signs. While inflation, 
infrastructural development (mobile phone penetration), political globalisation and civil 
conflicts affect inflation positively, the sign of exchange rate is mixed, while GDP growth 
mitigates the scourge. The ambiguity of the exchange rate is consistent with the discussion on 
the data section. As to what concerns the negative GDP growth effect, economic prosperity 
provides  an economic outlook that is conducive for employment and characterised with less 
ambiguity on the part of investors who often prefer investment strategies that are less 
ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). Hence, opportunities associated with broad-based 
economic growth in terms of employment and reductions of inequality are likely to sway the 
youth from terrorist sentiments (Singh, 2001, 2007; Efobi et al., 2015).   
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Table 4: Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Terrorism (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (LnDomter) Transnational Terrorism (LnTranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.70*** -1.09*** -4.050** -5.25*** -3.19** -2.483 -2.148** -1.80*** -4.38*** -1.624 0.521 -0.630 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.002) (0.043) (0.475) (0.018) (0.000) (0.008) (0.154) (0.759) (0.697) 
LnBilaid (Bilteral aid) 0.219** 0.000 0.231* 0.326*** 0.389*** 0.233 0.129** 0.040** 0.211* 0.211*** 0.110 -0.193* 
 (0.011) (0.992) (0.085) (0.005) (0.000) (0.202) (0.046) (0.039) (0.059) (0.007) (0.319) (0.052) 
GDPg -0.025 0.000 -0.036 -0.022 0.001 -0.023 -0.001 0.002 -0.020 -0.022 0.028 0.019 
 (0.278) (0.985) (0.305) (0.497) (0.962) (0.632) (0.951) (0.714) (0.506) (0.313) (0.430) (0.477) 
LnInflation 0.214*** 0.000 0.051 0.242*** 0.255*** 0.257** 0.155*** 0.057*** 0.131 0.110** 0.145* 0.234*** 
 (0.001) (0.988) (0.584) (0.005) (0.001) (0.027) (0.001) (0.000) (0.120) (0.049) (0.077) (0.001) 
LnInfrastructure 0.370*** -0.000 0.381** 0.455*** 0.466*** 0.278 0.268*** 0.042 0.265* 0.273*** 0.413*** 0.254** 
 (0.000) (0.985) (0.025) (0.002) (0.000) (0.245) (0.001) (0.252) (0.086) (0.007) (0.002) (0.032) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.017 0.000 0.096*** -0.015 -0.042* -0.026 0.012 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.041 
 (0.445) (0.995) (0.004) (0.638) (0.095) (0.604) (0.495) (0.862) (0.941) (0.857) (0.909) (0.119) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.789** -0.000 0.366 0.728 0.400 0.674 0.196 0.063 0.482 -0.016 -0.330 0.518 
 (0.015) (0.999) (0.424) (0.103) (0.335) (0.459) (0.406) (0.504) (0.250) (0.955) (0.443) (0.192) 
Civil Conflicts  0.447*** 0.298*** 0.485*** 0.520*** 0.479*** 0.535*** 0.260*** 0.179*** 0.242*** 0.275*** 0.295*** 0.283*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.353 0.069 0.139 0.215 0.299 0.268 0.271 0.094 0.130 0.160 0.158 0.233 
Fisher  26.98***      15.68***      
Observations  359 359 359 359 359 359 310 310 310 310 310 310 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (LnUnclter) Total Terrorism (LnTotter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -2.560* -1.09*** -2.43*** -1.248 -1.915 -5.486 -3.51*** -2.059** -4.709** -4.337** -1.331 -0.308 
 (0.064) (0.000) (0.002) (0.615) (0.224) (0.141) (0.002) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012) (0.362) (0.890) 
LnBilaid (Bilteral aid) -0.012 0.000 0.046 -0.017 -0.031 -0.447 0.255*** 0.140* 0.385*** 0.362*** 0.421*** 0.269** 
 (0.912) (1.000) (0.483) (0.927) (0.803) (0.146) (0.001) (0.050) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.015) 
GDPg -0.042 0.000 -0.040** -0.060 -0.032 -0.055 -0.033 -
0.083*** 
-0.089** -0.012 -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.121) (1.000) (0.016) (0.214) (0.246) (0.357) (0.165) (0.000) (0.030) (0.705) (0.766) (0.649) 
LnInflation -0.004 0.000 0.007 0.003 -0.072 -0.113 0.212*** 0.096** 0.096 0.200** 0.251*** 0.250*** 
 (0.938) (1.000) (0.862) (0.979) (0.344) (0.310) (0.000) (0.017) (0.319) (0.025) (0.000) (0.005) 
LnInfrastructure 0.235* 0.000 0.204*** 0.252 0.235 -0.103 0.350*** 0.181* 0.329* 0.426*** 0.480*** 0.447*** 
 (0.059) (1.000) (0.002) (0.242) (0.110) (0.802) (0.000) (0.055) (0.065) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.011 0.000 0.027* -0.036 -0.017 -0.072 0.007 0.018 0.019 -0.008 -0.038 -0.004 
 (0.679) (1.000) (0.064) (0.414) (0.588) (0.331) (0.747) (0.294) (0.582) (0.789) (0.107) (0.887) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.599 0.000 0.241 0.252 0.656 2.529** 0.526* 0.057 0.517 0.533 -0.040 0.081 
 (0.135) (1.000) (0.188) (0.694) (0.140) (0.038) (0.084) (0.815) (0.294) (0.234) (0.915) (0.885) 
Civil Conflicts  0.288*** 0.000 0.205*** 0.368*** 0.372*** 0.352*** 0.465*** 0.388*** 0.454*** 0.555*** 0.479*** 0.517*** 
 (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.248 -0.000 0.131 0.154 0.211 0.206 0.361 0.125 0.149 0.217 0.280 0.277 
Fisher  11.52***      30.98***      
Observations  202 202 202 202 202 202 398 398 398 398 398 398 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Terrorism is  least. LnDomter: Number of Domestic 
terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in 
unclear.  LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents. 
 
 The following findings can be established in relation to Table 5 on multilateral aid and 
terrorism. First, multilateral aid has: (1) no significant effect on domestic, unclear and total 
terrorisms and (2) a positive effect in the 0.10
th
 and 0.25
th
quantiles and negative effect in the 
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0.90
th
quantile on transnational terrorism.The significant control variables have the expected 
signs.  
 
Table 5: Multiateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Terrorism (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (LnDomter) Transnational Terrorism (LnTranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.69*** -1.09*** -4.34*** -4.63** -3.087** -2.964 -1.787* -1.60*** -4.56*** -0.854 -0.658 -0.839 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.031) (0.011) (0.380) (0.052) (0.000) (0.002) (0.464) (0.667) (0.488) 
LnMulaid (Multilteral aid) 0.091 0.000 0.123 0.028 0.085 0.041 -0.025 0.033** 0.137* -0.023 -0.078 -0.164*** 
 (0.247) (0.987) (0.209) (0.833) (0.213) (0.833) (0.647) (0.028) (0.080) (0.717) (0.328) (0.005) 
GDPg -0.023 0.000 -0.016 -0.014 0.010 -0.015 0.004 -0.0001 -0.028 0.005 0.012 0.025 
 (0.335) (0.977) (0.593) (0.726) (0.627) (0.714) (0.840) (0.986) (0.328) (0.794) (0.703) (0.117) 
LnInflation 0.196*** 0.000 0.091 0.233** 0.239*** 0.244** 0.134*** 0.069*** 0.138* 0.115** 0.126 0.219*** 
 (0.002) (0.985) (0.204) (0.014) (0.000) (0.015) (0.006) (0.000) (0.071) (0.047) (0.109) (0.000) 
LnInfrastructure 0.316*** -0.000 0.345** 0.256 0.317*** 0.176 0.162* 0.037 0.208 0.127 0.197 0.294*** 
 (0.004) (0.985) (0.029) (0.221) (0.001) (0.435) (0.054) (0.268) (0.154) (0.236) (0.100) (0.000) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.020 0.000 0.091*** 0.037 -0.028 -0.022 0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.003 0.020 0.030 
 (0.409) (0.994) (0.001) (0.363) (0.161) (0.647) (0.452) (0.844) (0.653) (0.886) (0.464) (0.128) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.994*** -0.000 0.588 0.971* 0.825*** 1.113 0.347 0.031 0.668* 0.133 0.283 0.505* 
 (0.002) (0.998) (0.113) (0.083) (0.008) (0.221) (0.151) (0.727) (0.079) (0.660) (0.465) (0.090) 
Civil Conflicts  0.466*** 0.298*** 0.455*** 0.576*** 0.527*** 0.566*** 0.269*** 0.164*** 0.246*** 0.263*** 0.294*** 0.238*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.347 0.069 0.137 0.207 0.280 0.269 0.259 0.092 0.112 0.148 0.158 0.239 
Fisher  26.58***      14.71***      
Observations  361 361 361 361 361 361 308 308 308 308 308 308 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (LnUnclter) Total Terrorism (LnTotter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -2.026 -1.09*** -1.71*** -0.703 -1.977 -3.161 -3.24*** -1.164 -2.839 -3.308** -3.165* -0.559 
 (0.143) (0.000) (0.004) (0.722) (0.289) (0.407) (0.005) (0.100) (0.157) (0.015) (0.087) (0.750) 
LnMulaid (Multeral aid) -0.025 0.000 0.017 -0.171 0.032 0.004 0.070 0.034 0.161 0.092 0.094 0.062 
 (0.797) (1.000) (0.693) (0.204) (0.803) (0.988) (0.131) (0.495) (0.200) (0.263) (0.346) (0.616) 
GDPg -0.046* 0.000 -0.034** -0.052 -0.036 -0.079 -0.027 -0.013 -0.045 -0.015 0.020 -0.018 
 (0.084) (1.000) (0.010) (0.198) (0.332) (0.162) (0.264) (0.425) (0.296) (0.576) (0.561) (0.618) 
LnInflation -0.028 0.000 -0.013 0 .007 -0.025 -0.097 0.187*** 0.019 0.067 0.205*** 0.240*** 0.232*** 
 (0.616) (1.000) (0.687) (0.946) (0.798) (0.376) (0.001) (0.570) (0.490) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
LnInfrastructure 0.163 0.000 0.185*** 0.112 0.141 0.296 0.265** 0.040 0.307 0.288** 0.257* 0.343** 
 (0.226) (1.000) (0.003) (0.576) (0.460) (0.461) (0.012) (0.648) (0.163) (0.022) (0.069) (0.019) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.010 0.000 0.025** -0.014 -0.028 -0.033 0.009 0.0006 0.028 0.013 -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.724) (1.000) (0.041) (0.729) (0.481) (0.660) (0.697) (0.963) (0.448) (0.614) (0.394) (0.396) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.513 0.000 0.121 0.287 0.572 1.134 0.751** -0.025 0.357 0.676* 0.904* 0.504 
 (0.164) (1.000) (0.141) (0.566) (0.250) (0.302) (0.013) (0.895) (0.504) (0.054) (0.058) (0.286) 
Civil Conflicts  0.288*** 0.000 0.216*** 0.381*** 0.368*** 0.468*** 0.487*** 0.392*** 0.460*** 0.567*** 0.519*** 0.536*** 
 (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.246 -0.000 0.128 0.148 0.210 0.217 0.346 0.122 0.129 0.205 0.254 0.273 
Fisher  10.96***      28.45***      
Observations  202 202 202 202 202 202 398 398 398 398 398 398 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Terrorism is least.LnDomter: Number of Domestic 
terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in 
unclear.  LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents. 
 
The following findings can be established with regards to total aid and terrorism in Table 6. 
First, total aid: (i) increases domestic terrorism from the 0.50
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantile; (ii) 
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increases transnational terrorism from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.25
th
quantile but decreases it at the 
0.90
th
quantile; (iii) has no significant effect on unclear terrorism and (iv) consistently 
increases total terrorism in a U-shape pattern from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantiles. Second, 
the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
Table 6: Total aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: Terrorism (Ln) 
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
     
 Domestic Terrorism (LnDomter) Transnational Terrorism (LnTranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -4.85*** -1.09*** -4.69*** -6.07*** -3.905** -3.153 -2.262** -1.87*** -5.22*** -1.345 0.293 -0.724 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.017) (0.371) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.257) (0.872) (0.702) 
LnTotaid (Total aid) 0.207** 0.000 0.104 0.270*** 0.379*** 0.177 0.101 0.057*** 0.187* 0.132 0.097 -0.175* 
 (0.030) (0.992) (0.390) (0.006) (0.000) (0.435) (0.148) (0.006) (0.085) (0.128) (0.464) (0.089) 
GDPg -0.023 0.000 -0.018 -0.015 -0.014 -0.020 0.001 -0.0009 -0.031 -0.008 0.029 0.019 
 (0.325) (0.983) (0.541) (0.563) (0.643) (0.175) (0.933) (0.897) (0.286) (0.705) (0.468) (0.583) 
LnInflation 0.216*** 0.000 0.068 0.255*** 0.232*** 0.254* 0.156*** 0.058*** 0.155** 0.115* 0.152* 0.234*** 
 (0.000) (0.986) (0.363) (0.000) (0.004) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) (0.048) (0.050) (0.085) (0.005) 
LnInfrastructure 0.386*** -0.000 0.313** 0.473*** 0.400*** 0.194 0.255*** 0.056 0.190 0.237** 0.399** 0.239* 
 (0.000) (0.987) (0.045) (0.000) (0.002) (0.437) (0.002) (0.140) (0.216) (0.033) (0.011) (0.059) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.016 0.000 0.088*** -0.011 -0.035 -0.015 0.012 0.001 0.010 -0.007 -0.001 0.046 
 (0.477) (0.996) (0.002) (0.653) (0.245) (0.770) (0.419) (0.876) (0.741) (0.723) (0.950) (0.119) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.814** -0.000 0.700* 0.944*** 0.588 0.935 0.252 0.048 0.714* 0.006 -0.270 0.539 
 (0.014) (0.999) (0.077) (0.008) (0.186) (0.332) (0.294) (0.619) (0.073) (0.982) (0.565) (0.233) 
Civil Conflicts  0.451*** 0.298*** 0.465*** 0.558*** 0.490*** 0.539*** 0.264*** 0.179*** 0.240*** 0.281*** 0.295*** 0.268*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.356 0.069 0.137 0.221 0.298 0.268 0.270 0.095 0.128 0.160 0.155 0.23 
Fisher  20.08***      16.03***      
Observations  364 364 364 364 364 364 314 314 314 314 314 314 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (LnUnclter) Total Terrorism (LnTotter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -2.405* -1.09*** -1.780** -1.296 -2.884 -4.087 -3.72*** -1.544** -4.49*** -4.78*** -2.225 -0.439 
 (0.079) (0.000) (0.013) (0.753) (0.199) (0.281) (0.001) (0.013) (0.007) (0.001) (0.164) (0.809) 
LnTotlaid (Total aid) 0.010 0.000 0.043 0.069 0.015 -0.252 0.241*** 0.052 0.349*** 0.261*** 0.444*** 0.248 
 (0.934) (1.000) (0.479) (0.724) (0.938) (0.548) (0.007) (0.310) (0.007) (0.009) (0.000) (0.076) 
GDPg -0.043 0.000 -
0.046*** 
-0.051 -0.017 -0.060 -0.032 -0.024* -0.089** -0.017 -0.002 -0.010 
 (0.110) (1.000) (0.003) (0.281) (0.678) (0.359) (0.192) (0.098) (0.017) (0.538) (0.948) (0.792) 
LnInflation -0.005 0.000 -0.016 0.022 -0.051 -0.094 0.214*** 0.033 0.097 0.238*** 0.255***   0.240** 
 (0.921) (1.000) (0.673) (0.856) (0.663) (0.398) (0.000) (0.225) (0.264) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) 
LnInfrastructure 0.203 0.000 0.204*** 0.186 0.193 -0.060 0.358*** 0.052 0.388** 0.370***  0.543*** 0.395** 
 (0.131) (1.000) (0.002) (0.403) (0.396) (0.897) (0.001) (0.465) (0.024) (0.003) (0.000) (0.012) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) -0.008 0.000 0.021 -0.039 -0.036 -0.048 0.005 -0.002 0.027 -0.015 -0.043 -0.009 
 (0.758) (1.000) (0.133) (0.400) (0.416) (0.555) (0.800) (0.878) (0.387) (0.562) (0.099) (0.796) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.535 0.000 0.108 0.131 0.820 1.829 0.566* 0.038 0.440 0.745** 0.085 0.130 
 (0.186) (1.000) (0.531) (0.829) (0.202) (0.164) (0.069) (0.820) (0.320) (0.044) (0.842) (0.794) 
Civil Conflicts  0.286*** 0.000 0.214*** 0.356*** 0.381*** 0.463*** 0.470*** 0.389*** 0.481*** 0.568*** 0.475*** 0.534*** 
 (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.240 -0.000 0.130 0.148 0.207 0.200 0.361 0.123 0.146 0.218 0.279 0.275 
Fisher  11.14***      31.58***      
Observations  205 205 205 205 205 205 404 404 404 404 404 404 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Terrorism is  least.LnDomter: Number of Domestic 
terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in 
unclear.  LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents. 
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3.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 
 We further discuss the results in three main strands, notably: (i) the overwhelming 
negative effect of foreign aid variables on terrorism dynamics, (ii) comparing effects across 
panels and specifications and (iii) comparing and contrasting findings with previous studies 
that have employed the same dataset.  
 The consistent negative impact of foreign aid on terrorism (especially the effects of 
bilateral and total aid) may be explained from three angles: the motives of aid, insufficiency 
of aid and usage of aid (mismanagement). First, the motives of aid substantially vary from one 
donor to another. For instance, while the USA is substantially involved in Africa for security 
reasons, China’s and France’s presence in the continent are fundamentally driven by 
economic and politico-economic interests respectively. It also depends on the outcome of 
bargaining among donors ‘“Aid is the outcome of bargaining in a kind of political market 
made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and recipient government 
officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these vary over time. For instance, 
economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid 
and political goals in French aid. Hence, few would object to the inference that our findings 
may also be explained by a motivation of the French to maintain their colonial legacies and 
influence in Africa” (Asongu, 2014c, p. 472).In light of the above, the effect of aid on 
terrorism may be counterproductive, partly because it may also fail to address the root causes 
of terrorism which are often associated with inequality, religious fundamentalism and 
aversion to neo-colonialism, among others. This explanation is broadly consistent with  the 
stance in the literature sustaining that overly reliance on development assistance could 
promote political instability owing to diminishing political accountability and low 
representation (Eubank, 2012; Asongu, 2015).  
 Second, insufficient foreign aid devoted to fighting terrorism (through inter alia, 
subsidising government expenditure, education, stimulating economic growth…etc) may end-
up instead producing the opposite effect. For instance, much has been documented on the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) joining the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
because of insufficient or lack of aid (Sherlock, 2014). Accordingly, in June 2014, nine USA-
backed FSA commanders quit because of lack of aid (Syrian Free Press, 2014)
2
.  
                                                          
2
Some relevant excerpts from the Syrian Free Press include: “While we thank donor countries for their 
assistance, it has been really insufficient, and simply too little to win the fight”…“We are fighting both the army 
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Third, moral issues in the usage of funds like corruption and concentration of 
resources among the military elite could also explain the negative relationship. For instance, 
Efobi et al. (2015) have conditioned the effectiveness of development assistance in the fight 
against terrorism on corruption-control. Moreover, the FSA commanders have been living 
lavishly in Turkey instead to going to the battle front (Syrian Free Press, 2014). This point 
also doubles as ‘strategic and tactical military issues’ which we cannot engage to elaborate 
detail because they are beyond our expertise and out of scope.  
 As a policy implication, it is important to: (i) tailor foreign aid towards addressing the 
root causes of terrorism instead of the remote causes; (ii) increase aid to preventing freedom 
fighters from joining enemy ranks (iii) use corruption-free mechanisms to channel foreign aid 
destined to fighting and/or preventing terrorism.  
 In the second strand, it is relevant to compare the effects across panels and 
specifications. After comparing the findings, the following merit some elucidation: (i) the 
effect of total aid is driven substantially by bilateral aid, (ii) but for some significant effects on 
transnational terrorism, the impact of multilateral aid is consistently not significant and (iii) 
the finding that all forms of aid consistently mitigate transnational terrorism in the 
0.90
th
quantile.  
 First, the fact that bilateral aid is established to substantially drive total aid builds on 
the evidence that their findings have similar tendencies in terms of significance for the most 
part,when compared. This tendency is unsurprising because bilateral (multilateral) aid is 
correlated with total aid at the height of 0.958 (0.772). We may therefore exceptionally 
establish that contrary to mainstream econometrics cautions, correlations here are relevant in 
determining causality.  
 Second, the fact that bilateral (multilateral) aid is overwhelmingly (scantily) 
significant in affecting terrorism, may be traceable to the; (i) size-effect in total aid and (ii) 
political economy of foreign aid. (1) From the size-effect in total aid, consistent with the 
narrative provided in the preceding paragraph, it is logical to expect bilateral aid to be closely 
related to the effect of total aid and hence, significantly different from the effects of 
multilateral aid because it is more closely associated with total foreign aid. Moreover, the 
greater the quantity of aid destined for a given development project, the more it is likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),”…. “Yet we haven’t got the help we need from countries who say 
they support our demands for democracy and a civil state.” 
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used positively or negatively to influence the underlying development outcome. (2) The 
greater significant influence of bilateral aid may be explained by the political economy of 
foreign aid. The strings attached to bilateral aid vis-à-vis multilateral aid are more likely to be 
greater because the negotiation process involves two parties and consensus is easily reached 
on the allocation of funds to fight terrorism purposes. Conversely, with respect to multilateral 
development assistance, multiple donors are involved with potentially conflicting interest at 
play. Whereas recent survey of the literature has established no apparent evidence on the 
effectiveness of one form of aid vis-à-vis another, when it comes to development outcomes in 
recipient countries (Biscaye et al., 2015), the political economy explanation provided sounds 
logical on two grounds: (i) it relates to differences in significance and not in terms of the signs 
of significance and (ii) from common sense bilateral aid may engender less bureaucracy and 
ineffectiveness (e.gfrom former colonial powers to former colonies with the prime ambition 
of preserving some colonial legacies and strategic interests).  
Two policy implications results from the above, notably the need to work towards: a 
reversal of the positive effect of bilateral aid and an understanding of reasons behind the 
overwhelming insignificance of the multilateral aid effect.  
Third, the fact that all forms of aid consistently mitigate transnational terrorism in the 
0.90
th
quantile has a very straight forward policy implication: foreign aid is more effective at 
fighting terrorism exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are 
highest. This finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings from Boutton and Carter 
(2013) because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting 
transnational terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target 
their interests. Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with 
initial levels of transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in 
recipient countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism. 
 The third strand is in line with the motivation provided for the choice of our data and 
sample. Hence,  we devote space to discussing how the findings relate to and/or differ from 
those established by the literature based on the same sample. It should be noted that while 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015) have employed FDI as the development 
outcome, we have directly assessed the effect of foreign aid on terrorism. Accordingly, the 
underlying studies have investigated the hypothetical role of foreign aid in dampening the 
potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), contingent on 
corruption-control levels in recipient countries (Efobi et al., 2015). Whereas the former has 
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established evidence of the underlying hypothesis, results of the latter have only partially 
confirmed findings of the former.  
For the purpose of avoiding repetitions and interest of remaining succinct, the results 
as discussed above improve our understanding of prior exposition by clarifying the 
hypothetically negative effect of foreign aid on terrorism. From our findings, we have 
established that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism 
exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. Two 
policy implications are apparent. First, it is relevant to first of all establish that foreign aid 
mitigates terrorism before assessing its role in potentially mitigating the negative effect of 
terrorism on macroeconomic outcomes. Second, Applied econometrics should not be 
restricted to the refutation or acceptance of existing theories. Therefore, extending previous 
studies with the same periodicity and sample is also a very useful scientific activity that 
discloses interesting policy implications. 
 
4. Conclusion and further directions 
 
We have built on previous literature to assess when foreign aid is effective in fighting 
terrorism using quantile regressions on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 
1984-2008.  Bilteral, multilateral and total aid indicators are used whereas terrorism includes: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. We have consistently 
established that foreign aid (bilateral, multilateral and total) is effective at fighting terrorism 
exclusively in countries where existing levels of transnational terrorism are highest. This 
finding is consistent with our theoretical underpinnings from Boutton and Carter (2013) 
because donors have been documented to allocate more aid towards fighting transnational 
terrorist activities in recipient countries because they are more likely to target their interests. 
Moreover, the propensity of donor interest at stake is likely to increase with initial levels of 
transnational terrorism, such that the effect of foreign aid is most significant in recipient 
countries with the highest levels of transnational terrorism.  
 We summarise results from which the main finding is extracted as follows. First, 
bilateral aid:  (i) increases domestic terrorism consistently with increasing magnitude from the 
0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantile; (ii) increases transnational terrorism from the 0.10
th
 to the 
0.50
th
quantile but decreases it at the 0.90
th
quantile; (iii) has no significant effect on unclear 
terrorism and (iv) consistently increases total terrorism in a wave-like pattern. Second, 
multilateral aid has: (i) no significant effect on domestic, unclear and total terrorisms and (ii) 
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a positive effect in the 0.10
th
 and 0.25
th
quantiles and negative effect in the 0.90
th
quantile. 
Third, total aid (i) increases domestic terrorism from the 0.50
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantile; (ii) 
increases transnational terrorism from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.25
th
quantile but decreases it at the 
0.90
th
quantile; (iii) has no significant effect on unclear terrorism and (iv) consistently 
increases total terrorism in a U-shape pattern from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
quantiles. 
 Future research directions could focus on inter alia: (i) using a post-Arab Spring 
periodicity to assess new patterns of the underlying relationships; (ii) engage country-specific 
studies because while the effect of foreign aid  on terrorism have been substantially negative 
in this study, the involvement of Kenya in Somalia to fight Al Shabab with USA aid (for 
example) is proving successful and (iii) decomposing developing assistance into sector-
specific aid could improve our insights into the aid-terrorism nexus.  
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